Rockets for Peace: Launching a New Era of International Cooperation
A rocket leaves the launch pad and, for the first few seconds of flight, appears indistinguishable from a ballistic missile. Observing adversaries might not pause for clarification. In that narrow window between ignition and trajectory confirmation, miscalculation becomes an expensive risk.
This technical ambiguity defines the security dilemma surrounding modern launch technology. Dual-use systems blur the line between civilian exploration and weapons development. The United States’ response to Iran’s Safir and Simorgh launch vehicles illustrates the problem. Their engineering overlaps with ballistic missile technology, prompting monitoring through the U.S. Space Command’s Combined Space Operations Center because early ascent signatures resemble a missile test. The distinction between a peaceful launch and a weapons demonstration often becomes clear only after commanders must make an initial threat assessment. Without transparency measures, ambiguity fuels suspicion.
History offers a precedent for managing this dilemma. In an address to the United Nations on December 8, 1953, President Eisenhower refused to “accept helplessly the probability of civilization destroyed,” and instead embraced “mankind’s never-ending quest for peace, and mankind’s God-given capacity to build.” He outlined a strategy for global cooperation on nuclear energy, so-called “Atoms for Peace,” and enthusiastically extended an invitation of partnership to the Soviet Union. Rather than attempting to suppress atomic knowledge, the initiative sought to channel it. Nuclear cooperation was conditioned on safeguards and inspections, eventually institutionalized through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The lesson was clear: dual-use capability cannot be erased, but it can be governed through structured transparency.
In the world of the 21st century, nuclear brinkmanship is no longer the central focus of global conflict. Instead, as strategic rivalry fractalizes, access to a panoply of emerging technologies and the development of industrial capacity are the key ingredients for establishing a competitive advantage. As hypersonic weapons and UAVs proliferate, the distance between attackers and targets in war no longer matters. Hostile actors do not need nuclear warheads to unleash devastation anywhere in the world, relying instead on speed and pinpoint accuracy. Given the nature of black markets and global arms trading, access to militarized rocket-based technologies might not be reliably controllable. That being said, it may be possible to repurpose the supply chains that produce them for higher and more peaceful ends. This is the premise of our “Rockets for Peace” proposal, a spiritual successor to Eisenhower’s nuclear initiative.
We argue that the United States should strive to adopt a “Rockets for Peace” strategy in the Middle East, modeled on Eisenhower’s institutional logic, to convert missile-capable infrastructure across the Arabian Gulf into transparent civilian space programs. Through conditional technical cooperation, market incentives, and regional governance mechanisms, policymakers in Washington can reduce the risk of miscalculation, counter Chinese influence, and transform dual-use launch systems from a source of suspicion into a platform for scientific and economic integration.
The core premise is conversion rather than containment. States with missile-capable aerospace infrastructure should be offered structured access to civilian partnerships in exchange for measurable commitments to transparency. Under Rockets for Peace, U.S. technical cooperation, export licensing flexibility, and joint mission participation could be tied to advance launch notifications, telemetry sharing during ascent, publication of orbital parameters, and third-party observation of launch facilities. Launch cooperation becomes conditional visibility.
Private industry can help facilitate burgeoning cooperative initiatives. Export control carve-outs, development finance guarantees, and joint venture programs could incentivize U.S. firms to partner with Saudi and Emirati entities in satellite manufacturing, Earth observation, and scientific payload development. Access to U.S. components, insurance markets, and launch service contracts could gradually expand in proportion to demonstrated compliance with transparency standards. From the Arabian standpoint, demonstrating good-faith adherence to peaceful norms would thus become more politically valuable than strategic ambiguity.
International institutions reinforce the framework. Confidence-building measures could be embedded within existing structures, such as the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), and aligned with Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines. These forum-based organizations are already helping the United States and its partners maintain effective global norms for responsible conduct in space and defense. Rather than relying on muddled bureaucratic procedure, a stakeholder-driven approach rests on layered incentives that integrate regional actors into established governance networks.
The strategy is feasible because operational interdependence already exists. The UAE’s Emirates Mars Mission relied on support from the University of Colorado Boulder’s Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics and NASA’s Deep Space Network. The UAE is a signatory of the Artemis Accords and contributes airlock technology to the Gateway lunar space station. Rashid Rover 2 is scheduled to fly aboard a U.S.-built lander with instruments developed in cooperation with France’s CNES and the Mohammed Bin Rashid Space Center. Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund has invested in American aerospace firms, and Saudi astronauts flew aboard SpaceX’s Crew Dragon during the Axiom 2 mission.
Shared interests in scientific research further reinforce cooperation. The Middle East is warming at roughly twice the global average, and dust storms across Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia have intensified in recent years. NASA already shares Earth observation data with Jordan’s Royal Scientific Society and Morocco’s Centre Royal de Télédétection Spatiale. Rockets for Peace could formalize a regional climate data pipeline built on U.S. satellite capabilities and Middle Eastern ground stations. The same propulsion engineering, guidance systems, and composite manufacturing techniques used in missile development could be redirected toward small satellite launch vehicles for deploying environmental monitoring constellations. Technologies once used to monitor security threats could instead be used to track desertification risks and areas of water stress.
Human capital development represents another pillar. The UAE has sent dozens of engineers to NASA facilities for training, and Saudi Arabia sponsors aerospace students in the United States. A formalized framework would expand these pipelines, aligning engineers with U.S. safety standards and transparency practices. Civilian aerospace sectors in the Gulf have already created entry points for women in STEM fields, particularly in planetary science and satellite engineering. Expanding cooperative training would reinforce merit-based advancement and gradually shift labor incentives toward high-skilled, high-value industries.
Commercial reliance provides additional leverage. Firms such as SpaceX, Axiom, and Blue Origin dominate regional access to human spaceflight and suborbital research. Licensing regimes and contractual requirements allow the United States to export operational norms through market mechanisms. This is strategically significant as China expands its regional presence and seeks to influence global space governance. Just as third-world alliances in the Cold War era helped the United States establish leverage in nuclear arms issues against the Soviet Union, so too must America in the twenty-first century understand the value of gaining a foothold in the Middle East before the Chinese do.
Regional governance gaps make institutionalization urgent. While several Middle Eastern states have signed the Artemis Accords, others remain outside that framework, exacerbating the risk of fragmentation in the normative landscape. Rockets for Peace could establish a regional pre-launch notification system modeled on the Hague Code of Conduct and support development of a Space Situational Awareness node integrated with the U.S. 18th Space Defense Squadron network. These measures would reduce debris risks, increase predictability, and create a trusted technical interface across the region.
Atoms for Peace succeeded because it recognized that emerging technologies pose both opportunities and dangers. Rockets for Peace applies that same logic to launch systems. Dual-use capability cannot be uninvented, but it can be steered. By converting missile heritage into transparent civilian infrastructure, the United States can reduce escalation risks, strengthen alliances, and ensure that space in the Middle East develops as a domain of integration rather than confrontation.
